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UNIFORM COMMERCIAL ACTS
In two recent numbers of the Dickinson Law Review,1
Mr. J. P. McKeehan pointed out some points of difference
in various provisions of the Uniform Sales Act, the Warehouse Receipts Act the Uniform Bills of Lading Act, and
the Uniform Stock Certificate Act, and suggested that these
Acts ought to be uniform with one another, and the documents dealt with in them put "on exactly the same basis."
He adds: "It would greatly reduce the labor of students
and practitioners and the writer knows of no objection
which could be urged against such a course."
Mr. McKeehan has rendered good service in comparing these various statutes, and he might well have included
in his comparison the Negotiable Instruments Law. To
such a proposed addition he would probably reply that a bill
of exchange or promissory note is not a document of title.
Like a
This is true, but neither is a stock certificate.
promissory note it is itself an obligation or the tangible
evidence of an intangible obligation, rather than the symbol
of tangible property; and if a stock certificate is to be compared with a warehouse receipt, a promissory note which
presents a nearer analogy, might well be.
'November and December, 1915.
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This suggestion is made because it will indicate to the
reader at once that there may be some objection to putting
the various documents on exactly the same basis.
The
reader may perceive that perhaps mercantile custom in regard to the use of the several documents is not identical,
and because of this difference the questions which in fact
arise and press for decision are not identical.
It would have been simpler and easier for students to
remember, if it were provided that the endorsement of a
bill of lading or warehouse receipt had the same effect as
the endorsement of a promissory 'note. There is perhaps
no good reason in theory why it should not have that effect,
but law and custom are both otherwise, and the Commissioners did not conceive it to be their duty to attempt for the
sake of symmetry to reverse existing law and custom.
It is no doubt true that if three at least of the commercial acts of which Mr. McKeehan wrote (for the stock transfer act should be excluded) had been simultaneously prepared, greater similarity of wording in some instances, and
of substantive law in one or two matters, might have been
achieved. As each successive Act was drawn, the temptation
to attempt improvements existed, and to a slight extent was
yielded to. The following examination will, however, show
that most of the differences in the statutes are not accidental but intentional, and exist for good reasons.
The Commissioners in drawing the statutes observed
two principles, which, on the whole, seem wise.
First, to follow existing law unless it conflicted with
recognized mercantile custom;
Second, to make special provision for cases which had
in fact caused litigation and diversity of judicial decision.
Matters which conceivably might arise, but in fact had
not arisen, were not much dealt with, except so far as the
general principles laid down in the Act necessarily involved
a decision of them. This accounts for certain of the instances where a provision is made in regard to one kind of
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document but no corresponding provision in regard to other
documents, though the same situation is theoretically possiDrafts with warehouse receipts attached, or with
ble.
stock certificates attached, may be sent like drafts with bills
of lading attached, but while the practice is so common with
bills of lading as to make it desirable to state fully the
rights of the parties, the same fullness did not seem necessary with warehouse receipts and stock certificates.
With this introduction some comments may be made
on a few of the specific points of Mr. McKeehan's articles
PermissibleProvisionsin Documents
"A warehouseman, as the critic says, may insert any
other provision not 'contrary to the provisions of the act.'
But a carrier may not insert any provision 'contraryto law
or public policy."
There is a good reason for this distinction. It was
found possible to insert in the Warehouse Receipts Act, a
sufficient code to cover all that was forbidden. It was
not possible to do this in the case of a bill of lading. Interstate bills of lading are governed as to their form by the
orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission. It was of
vital importance that the State statute should be and should
continue in harmony with the rules laid down in Washington. Morover some of the provisions in bills of lading may
be governed by the lex loci solutionis,and a statute in force
in the place of the contract cannot dictate what shall be
permissible in another state.
Marking Documents
Mr. McKeehan asks why should not failure to mark a
document "not negotiable" result in making the document
negotiable; or, why require the insertion of the words at all.
He points out that it is folly to rely upon the presence or
the absence of the words under the present law; since cred-
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itors may levy on the goods. The conclusion of the Commissioners on this matter, seems amply justified. Nobody
ought to rely on the presence or absence of the words in
question, but many foolish persons do. When the public
has become as well educated in regard to the importance
of the words "order" or "bearer" in bills of lading as it is
in regard to those words in promissory notes, marking
documents "not negotiable" will probably be unnecessary.
At present it is desirable in order to save foolish or ignorant persons from the consequences of their mistakes. The
penalties in the Statutes are sufficient to induce warehousemen and carriers to mark the documents as the law requires, and if this result is achieved the object of the Commissioners has been obtained. On the other hand, it did
not seem wise to disregard the whole mercantile doctrine
as to the presence or absence of the words "order," or "bearer," determining negotiability, and to substitute a marking
or failure to mark "not negotiable" as an exclusive test. If a
bailee issued a document to order, and marked it "not negotiable," it would then be non-negotiable. This was an especially obnoxious habit by which some carriers sought to
limit their obligations on order bills.
The reason why
criminal liability instead of civil liability is provided for
failure properly to mark bills of lading is not due to accident. A bill of lading issued in Pennsylvania where the
Bills of Lading Act iq in force, may be bought in Mississippi
where that Act is not in force.
Whether the Pennsylvania law could give the Mississippi buyer: by virtue of the purchase of the document a right which the
Common law did not give, and make the right enforceable
in Mississippi may perhaps be questioned.
The desire of
the Commissioners was to induce the carrier to mark the
document carefully. The criminal penalty in the case of
the carrier seemed the only effective way.
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Assent to Terms
There has been much litigation upon the question
whether the acceptance of a bill of lading without objection
indicates assent to its terms. The point therefore is covered in the Bills of Lading Act. There has not been the same
litigation, in regard to warehouse receipts, whether because
receipts do not ordinarily contain the numerous and frequently harsh provisions of bills of lading, it is unnecessary to inquire. The competition between warehouses
in the same city creates a situation where it is impossible
for an individual warehouseman to impose severe conditions. As practical conditions seemed to require no legislation concerning warehousemen on the point, it was left
to the common law. There is no reason to doubt that acceptance of a warehouse receipt, like the acceptance of a
written contract to buy and sell, indicates assent to its
terms.
Excuses- for Non.-Delivery of Goods
Again the critic seems to assume that there is no reason
for the Warehouse Receipts Act requiring the warehouseman to find his excuse in the provisions of the Act, while
carriers may offer "any lawful excuse." If he will consider that the Pennsylvania Statute cannot determine what
excuse should be sufficient for discharging the carrier from
liability when he delivers the goods in Virginia, the reason
will be plain. Obviously it will not do to hold the carrier
liable in Pennsylvania for something which the Virginia
law compels him to do. Where goods are to be stored continuously in a State which enacts the Uniform Statute, all
excuses may be stated and a more complete dealing with the
situation is possible than where they are to be transported
to other States which may not enact the Statute.
Delivery To Agent
What has been just said also applies to the justification given the carrier when compelled by legal process.
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The Pennsylvania statute cannot prevent goods being taken
from the carrier by legal process in another State, but it
can provide that they shall not be taken from a Pennsylvania warehouseman except as stated in the statute itsel
As to the requirement of written authority in the Warehouse Receipts Act while oral authority suffices under the
Bills of Lading Act, it is to be said that these provisions
were made after careful consultation with the American
Warehousemen's Association on the one side, and representatives of leading railroads on the other.
The different
ways in which business is transacted by carriers and warehousemen is the cause of the difference. A warehouseman
need do business only at one warehouse, or a few warehouses, all ordinarily in the same city, a carrier must do
business at hundreds of stations-many of them small, and
in charge of clerks who receive small compensation. Moreover, the carrier far more frequently than the warehouseman is under pressure to make delivery promptly.
Lost Documents
The reason for requiring greater strictness in regard
to lost warehouse receipts than in regard to documents issued by carriers and corporations is because many States
impose little or no limitation on the right of any person,
whether financially responsible or not, to go into the business of warehousing. In consequence of this also it seemed
desirable to impose a criminal penalty for issuing a receipt
to replace one alleged to be lost, without proceedings establishing the fact of loss.
Use of Duplicates
Once more, the fact that warehouse receipts relate to
goods in storage, while bills of lading relate to goods being
transported, is the cause of a difference between the Statutes, namely that in regard to implied warranties on the
issue of duplicates. If a warehouse receipt is cancelled, it
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is cancelled where it is issued; but a bill of lading issued
in Philadelphia may be cancelled in San Francisco; and the
degree of knowledge of the situation which is possible in
the case of warehouse receipts to any warehouseman who is
not negligent, may not be possible in the case of bills of
lading. For this reason too, knowledge on the part of the
carrier is made a condition of criminal liability.
Bailee Claiming Title
The Warehouse Receipts Act states that the warehouseman can only set up a title in himself "derived directly or indirectly from the depositor, etc." The critic
says: "Surely a warehouseman may acquire title from one
named in the receipt by the depositor's direction as the one
to whom the goods are deliverable. And surely he may acquire title from one to whom a negotiable bill or receipt has
been negotiated, or from the transferee of a straight bill
or receipt." Surely he may ordinarily, the act says so, for
such a title is derived either directly or indirectly from the
depositor. The only difference between the literal meaning of the provision in the Warehouse Receipts Act, and
that in the Bill of Lading Act is that under the latter Statute, a title acquired by the consignee from some other
source than a direct or indirect transfer from the consignor, will pass to the purchaser. This is not expressly
stated in the Warehouse Receipts Act, and the wording
in the later Act was accordingly changed but it seems probable that a court would reach this desirable result even under the Warehouse Receipts Act.
What has already been said in regard to the difference
of the nature of the business of storing in one State and
transporting to other States, is the reason for the intentional difference of the acts in regard to the particularity
with which the amount of liens must be stated.
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Accommodation Bills and Receipts
How far Statutes, such as those in question, should
codify the law of agency is a practical rather than a theoretical question. The law is a seamless garment, and it is
impossible to find a fixed boundary for a given subject. In
general it was not deemed wise to codify the law of agency
as applied to all the situations where an agent might act
in connection with documents of title. The issue of fictitious or accommodation bills by railroad agents was, however, of such common occurrence and had been the subject
of so much litigation that a provision in regard to it was
inserted.
The critic comments on the risk of which the purchaser runs in regard to the quality of the goods; he does not,
however, suggest that the rule of the Statutes is improper.
The provisions in question were elaborately discussed by
warehousemen, carriers and lawyers, and the final result
was not reached carelessly or without thorough inquiry as
to its practical applications.
Creditors' Remedies
The same may be said in regard to the remedies provided by the Acts for attachment and levy. If these provisions do not go to the full extent of the mercantile theory
that the negotiable document is the sole representative of
the property, and while outstanding precludes seizure of the
goods as was suggested in the original drafts of the earlier
Acts, the advance upon the existing law is striking; and
though it is theoretically possible that an injunction will
be violated and a transfer made in spite of it, this will not
often happen.
The Form of Negotiable Documents
The Warehouse Receipts Act provides for negotiable
receipts either to order or to bearer. Under the Bills of
Lading Act, the only negotiable bills are order bills. After
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conferences with Warehousemen's Association, it appeared
that warehouse receipts were sometimes issued to bearer.
Bills of Lading have not been issued in this form generally,
if they have been at all, in recent years. The uniform
forms of bills of lading framed by the Interstate Commerce
Commission do not provide for bills to bearer. The Commissioners on Uniform State Laws took these mercantile
customs as they found them, especially as they seemed unobjectionable. Then, as bills of lading are not allowed under the Uniform Act to be issued to bearer, there was no
occasion to provide that a holder of a bill, in form negotiable by delivery, might restrict the negotiability by endorsement to himself or to a specified person. The bill of lading
will not be negotiable by delivery except when endorsed in
blank. By filling in his own name or that of another over
the blank endorsement, the negotiability of the bill, without the necessity of a new restrictive endorsement.
The Bills of Lading Act requires that the words "to
the order of" precede the name of the consignee. This requirement is in conformity with that of the uniform order
bill of the Interstate Commerce Commission. One of the
easiest ways to commit fraud with bills of lading formerly
was to take a spent straight bill of lading, which the carrier had not taken up, (as it need not) add the words "or
order" to the name of the consignee, and negotiate the document as an order bill. This possibility is entirely removed by the requirement that the words of negotiability shall
precede the name of the consignee. Indeed in the uniform
order bill of lading, the words of negotiability are printed
in the bill. Mr. McKeehan I think misinterprets the Warehouse Receipts Act if he thinks that under that Act the
words of negotiability must follow the name of the
person to whom the goods are deliverable. Words of negotiability in warehouse receipts, as in Bills and Notes,
may precede or follow the name of the consignee. In the
law of Bills and Notes and in common mercantile and legal
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speech, an instrument payable to the order of A, and payable to A or order, is equally designated as an instrument
payable to A or order; though in strictly logical speech,
an instrument in the first form is not payable to A directly, if he remains the holder.
The provision, which is so necessary in the case of bills
of lading that the words of negotiability shall precede the
consignee's name, was not equally necessary in the case of
warehouse receipts. Mr. McKeehan quotes as a statement
from my "Lectures on Commercial Law" (Sec. 179, page
98) that the risk that a negotiable document may be forged
or altered "has in practice proved the most serious risk of
all." He adds: "Forgery is easy because of the carelessness with which receipts and bills of lading are made out."
The statement in my lectures was made explicitly in regard
to Bills of Lading; the application to Warehouse Receipts
Acts is not mine. I do not think it true that warehouse
receipts are carelessly made out; they are ordinarily made
out carefully and can easily be so made out. Before the
enactment of the Warehouse Receipts Act, the practice was
usual as it now is to issue such receipts from a book with
serial numbers. Warehouse receipts are issued from the
principal office of the warehouseman and it is not difficult
in most cases to surround their issue with the care usual in
the issue of bills and notes if not with quite the same care
as is used in regard to stock certificates. Bills of Lading, on
the other hand, are issued from all stations on large railroad
systems. Instead of emanating from one central office,
they emanate from hundreds and with some railroads from
thousands of different points. Large shippers, especially
manufacturers frequently, if not usually, write their own
bills of lading, and the railroad agent merely signs the bill
presented to him, checking over the shipment hastily unless
it is a "shippers load and count" shipment. Under these
circumstances, there is great difficulty in surrounding the
issue of an order bill with the precautions which are desirable in case of a valuable negotiable document. It is
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not necessary here to discuss the attempts which have been
made to meet the difficulty. It is enough to point out here
that these difficulties do not exist in the case of Warehouse
Receipts, and that therefore it was unnecessary to put the
same restriction on their form as is put on the form of
bills of lading. The greatest risk in warehouse receipts is
their issue by warehousemen who are not financially responsible, and especially the possibility of the issue of receipts against the warehouseman's own goods and a subsequent dealing with both receipts and the goods. This risk
which is serious in the case of warehouse receipts is negligible in the case of bills of lading.
Purchase From a Thief or Finder
The opinion of the Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws undoubtedly underwent a change after the preparation of the Sales Act and Warehouse Receipts Act, and before the promulgation of the Bills of Lading Act and the
Stock Certificates Act. Even the earlier statutes go somewhat beyond the common law, as previously understood,
in protecting a purchaser of a document. The later statutes
give the same negotiability to Bills of Lading as Bills of
Exchange possess.
The difference between the statutes
is doubtless undesirable, but if considered a serious matter
is easily rectified by a brief amendment to the Warehouse
Receipts Act.
Summary
Enough has been said perhaps to indicate the undesirability, if not impossibility, of having identical provisions in
regard to bills of lading and warehouse receipts. A student who will carefully examine Mr. McKeehan's article
and the comments here made, will, I think be disposed to
agree that for most of the differences between the statutes, there is a valid reason. I have not discussed in de-
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tail all the reasons, but only the most striking ones. Such
small residuum of the points made by Mr. McKeehan as are
well taken, I hope will not seem to most students of the
subject of sufficient consequence to justify the somewhat
drastic remedy that he proposes.
SAMUEL WILLISTON.
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MOOT COURT
CHALMERS v. LONERGRAN & CO.
Principal and Agent-Scope of Authority-Implied Powers
STATEMENT OF FACTS
A was agent for Lonergran & Co., to sell its wares, and to account for the proceeds. He made sales amounting to $500. Unable
to pay the money, having used it, he borrowed $500 from Chalmers
on a note purporting to be that of Lonergran & Co., executed by him
as agent.
With this money he paid Lonergran & Co., who knew
nothing of the execution of the note, or of the manner in which A
had obtained the $500. Chalmers sues on the note, contending that
the defendant is liable, because it obtained the $500 lent on the note.
OP.INION OF THE COURT
FARRELL, J.
An agent has implied power to borrow money
only where the transaction of the business confided to him absolutely
requires the exercise of the power in order to carry it on; it will
not be implied merely because its exercise would be convenient or advantageous. Bickford v. Menier, 107 N. Y. 490. In the case at bar,
it is clear that the agent borrowed the money solely for his own
benefit and not for the benefit of those whom he represented.
It
would not be a fair rule to hold the principal liable for the rash acts
of his agent.
In Tucker v. Woolsey, 64 Barbour (N. Y.) 142, it was held that
the general power to borrow money is neither within the actual authority of the agent or its apparent scope. And so we think that in
the case at bar, A acted outside of the scope of his actual and apparent authority by borrowing money on a note purporting to be that
of Lonergran & Co. If A had used the money, and we have no
reason to believe that he did, to advance the interests of the firm
which he represented, there is no doubt but that the principal would
have been liable.
Where an agent is given authority to receive consignments of
goods from his principal and to sell them, and after paying the expenses of the business, to remit the balance to the principal, no
authority in the agent can be implied to borrow money for his principal, and he, the principal, is not liable for moneys borrowed by him
without his authority, to pay an indebtedness due from the agent t0
the principal. Bates v. First National Bank, 89 N. Y. 286. This
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doctrine applies exactly to the case which we are now considering.
We see no reason, nor can we find any authority, why an agent may
overstep his authority at any time, and work detriment to the interests of his principal, as well as to innocent third parties. But as
for third parties, they are expected to be on their guard. It is their
duty to find out just how far the authority of the agent extends.
Their ignorance or neglect to inquire into the authority of an agent
will in no way bind the principal.
In Kerns v. Piper, 4 Watts 222, it is said, "The acts of a servant
bind his master only when done in the course of the business committed to him, or within the scope of his authority specially delegated. It is no part of the business of a clerk in a store to borrow
money and draw bills and notes for it in the name of the firm."
Therefore, we come to the conclusion, that A, in borrowing
money for his own use in the name of Lonergran & Co., exceeded the
actual and apparent scope of his authority, and that the principal
cannot be held liable on this note even though he did receive the
money lent on it. We therefore render judgment for the defendant.
OPINION OF THE SUPERIOR COURT
It has been held in a large number of cases that a principal may
be held liable for an unauthorized loan, effected in his name by his
agent, of which he has received the benefit, and that it is immaterial
whether the principal acquired knowledge of the circumstances under
which the money was obtained before or after he received and used
the money. 6 L. R. A. N. S. 311, collecting the cases.
An exception to the foregoing rule is asserted in cases where the
money is received by the principal in satisfaction of an independent
obligation of the agent to the principal and without knowledge by the
principal of how the money was obtained. Thus in Case v. Hammond
Packing Co., 105 Mo. App. 168, 79 S. W. 732, the court said, "If
money due a principal from his agent is obtained by such Agent by
the unauthorized use of the principal's name, and paid over to the
princiapi, who receives it in good faith without notice, he is not
liable to the person from whom the agent got the money. The fact
that he keeps the money after being informed of how the agent obtained it is not a ratification." In Calhoun v. Piano Co. (Tenn.),
168 S. W. 149, a case which resembles the present case very closely,
it is held that "a principal does not, by accepting without knowledge
of the source, money on account from an agent who secures it by
executing a note in the name of the principal without authority,
render himself liable on the note, on the theory that, having accepted the benefit of the loan, he cannot repudiate liability for it."
To the same effect are Thacher v. Pray, 113 Mass. 291; Bald-
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wins v. Burrows, 47 N. Y. 212; Bohart v. Oberne, 36 Kansas 284,
19 Pac. 388.
Judgment affirmed.
TUMER v. X BANK
Banks and Banking-Promissory Notes--Collection-Notary PublicNegligence-Damages
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Tumer, a despositor in the bank, deposited with it for collection,
a note for five hundred dollars, drawn by Ferguson and endorsed by
Staples. When the note matured, the bank placed same in the hands
of a competent notary to collect or if not paid to protest. The notary
made demand for payment on the maker who did not pay. Before
making out his protest, he lost the note. The endorser was not notified of the default. In this action for damages for loss of the note,
it appeared that the bank failed to notify the plaintiff of the loss of
the note for nine months after it occurred. Plaintiff asks as damages, the face of the note with interest. The court instructs the jury
that it render a verdict for this amount.
Motion for a new trial.
Snyder, for the plaintiff.
Puhak, for the defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
PENNELL, J. The question to be decided in this case is as
follows: Whether a bank which receives a promissory note and transfers it to a notary public who later loses the note, is liable to the
depositor for the face of the note?
It is one of the many duties of a bank to receive deposits of
commercial paper for collection. The bank while not receiving a direct compensation from theplaintiff for the collection of the note
in question, received compensation indirectly because Tumer was a
regular depositor in the defendant's bank. What was the nature of
the relation between the plaintiff and the defendant?
This court
holds that the relation between the plaintiff and defendant was that
of principal and agent. The bank in turn put the note into the
hands of its notary public for collection. The notary thus became an
agent or attorney for the bank.
Attorney in its broadest sense
means: "One put in place of an other, an agent." 4 Cyc. 897.
"A collector who undertakes the collection of a claim is responsible for the negligence of the attorney employed by him, by whose
negligence the claim is lost." Siner v. Seame, 155 Pa. 62. In Mor-
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gan v. Tener, 83 Pa. 305, "A collection agency employed to collect a
claim, who placed said claim in the hands of an attorney, through
whose misconduct it is lost, is liable for the loss of said claim in the
absence of an express stipulation to the contrary in their receipt
given for the claim." We hold that the relation between the defendant in the case under consideration and the collection agency in
Morgan v. Tener quoted ante is identical.
The learned council for the defendant contends that when a bank
receives commercial paper for deposit and places it for collection in
the hands of a notary, the bank is simply an agent for transmission
and performs its entire duty when it delivers the paper to a suitable
agent for collection, and therefore the bank is not liable for negligence of the agent. Defendant's counsel relies upon Bellemire v.
The Bank of the United States, 4 Wharton 105, the doctrine of which
concisely stated is: "A bank is not liable for the neglect of a notary
to give notice of non-payment to an endorser when in the usual course
of business the bank places a note which is overdue in the notary's
hands for collection."
From Bellemire v. Bank, 4 Wharton 105, we quote from the opinion of Judge Gibson: "Had the plaintiff desired to have the services
of a special agent he would have been bound to furnish one; omitting
to do so he (the plaintiff) consented to let the matter take its course;
and the bank performed its duty by committing it to the person employed in its own concerns."
With the opinion of the learned courtlabove we are unable to
agree. First-We think there was no duty on the plaintiff to furnish a special agent; Second-That for the negligence of the notary
the defendant above should have been held liable.
In Bank of Delaware County v. Broorchall, 38 Pa. 135, it was
held: "A bank is liable to the plaintiff for a mistake in the date of
a note whereby the endorser is released when the note is placed by
the plaintiff in the hands of the bank for collection." In Exchange
National Bank of Pittsburg v. The Third National Bank of New
York, 112 United States 27G, the doctrine is as follows: One bank
is liable to a second bank for the amount of drafts which the first
bank sent to the second bank to collect and which the second bank
placed into the hands of its agent when the agent of the second bank
was negligent and did not see that the drafts were properly accepted.
In Walker v. Bank of the State of New York, 9 N. Y. 582, we find the
court held: "An agent to whom a bill is remitted for presentment,
becomes liable to his principal, if he receives anything short of an
acceptance and a loss ensues."
In a very recent case before the Superior Court of Pennsylvania,
Moldawer, Appellant v. Trust Company of North America, 57 Super-
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promissory note in the same city in which the bank does business,
and the bank places the note in the hands of an experienced notary
public with direction to collect or protest it for non-payment and the
notary loses it, and fails to protest it. Held. The bank will not be
liable for failure to protest the note, but the bank will be liable if it
neglects for months to give him notice of the loss of the note although
such notice was feasible.
The opinion of the court is that the motion for a new trial should
be refused and the judgment of the lower court should be affirmed.
OPINION OF THE SUPERIOR COURT
It is not necessary to decide that it is the duty of a bank to undertake the collection of notes payable to its customers. If it in
fact undertakes to collect a note, it assumes certain duties towards
the depositor of the note. It must preserve the note. It must, at
the proper time, make the effort prescribed by law, to collect it, or
failing therein, to complete the liability of any endorser, by the giving of timely notice to him of the non-payment.
That the bank may employ a notary to present the note to the
maker, and to demand of him payment, and should he fail to pay
it, to give notice to the endorser, is indisputable. Bellemire v. Bank
of U. S., 4 Wharton 105: Moldawer v. Trust Co., 57 Super. 66. Equally so is it, that it is not liable for any negligence of the notary,
whose repute as such officer, for care and competence, is fair. The
defendant then is not liable for the loss of the note by the notary.
Nor is it liable for the notary's failure to notify the endorser of the
refusal of the maker to pay the note, and for the consequent discharge of the endorser.
Has the bank done or omitted to do anything, the doing or not
doing of which was a breach of its duty? It seems that it was the
duty of the bank, on learning of the mishap to the note, promptly
to give notice thereof to the plaintiff, (Moldawer v. Trust Co., 57
Super. 66) and it did not give him this notice for nine months. For
this failure, the bank is liable to the plaintiff. 57 Super. 66, supra;
Moldawer v. Trust Co., 59 Super. 155.
What is the measure of its liability? If actual damage has been
suffered by the plaintiff, the bank is liable to pay a sum of money
which represents the damage.. No evidence has been given of this
damage. The liability of the maker of the note continues, notwithstanding the loss of the note. Its former existence and loss can be
established by the plaintiff, the bank, and the notary. No loss has
arisen then, so far as the ability of the plaintiff to enforce payment
from the maker is concerned. But the liability of the endorser has
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been lost. Whether this entails loss on the plaintiff depends in part,
on the amplitude of the maker's solvency. Recourse to the endorser
may, or may not be necessary. The sequence of loss to the plaintiff
from the discharge of the endorser depends likewise, on the solvency
of the latter. If he would have been unable to pay the note even
if he had been notified in time of the maker's failure to pay it, no
pecuniary loss to the plaintiff has been occasioned.
We are not to presume that the endorser was solvent, any more
than that the maker was solvent.
The maker solvent, no actual
damage arises from the discharge of the endorser.
The plaintiff has furnished no evidence concerning the capacity
to pay the note of the maker and the endorser. He should have done
so if he wanted substantial damages. Moldawer v. Trust Co., 57
Super, 66; 59 Super. 155. It follows, according to the cases just
cited, that he was entitled merely to nominal damages.
It is to be noticed however, that the loss of the endorser's liability was the result of the notary's carelessness, for which the bank
is not liable. The bank's delay in informing the plaintiff of the loss
of the note in no way contributed to the loss. Hence, had it appeared
that the maker was insolvent, and the endorser solvent, the plaintiff
would not have been entitled to recover the amount of the note.
Despite the care with which the learned court below has made its
investigation of the problem presented, and the noteworthy independence which it displays, we are obliged to dissent from its conclusion.
Reversed.

HOLLAND v. INSURANCE CO.
Casualty Insurance-Death By "External and Violent Means"-Poison
STATEMENT OF FACTS
William Holland obtained a policy of insurance on his life, purporting to insure against death occasioned by "externai, violent and
accidental means." Thinking a liquid in a glass was wine, whereas it
was a deadly poison, he drank it, and died 12 hours subsequently.
The company denies the policy covered such a death.
OPINION OF THE COURT
VAUGHAN, J. The question presented is whether death resulting from drinking poison in mistake for wine will preclude a recovery
on a life insurance policy purporting to insure against death occasioned by "external, violent and accidental means." The court, taking
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into view the facts that the policies are signed by the insurer, and
that the language employed is that of the insurer, have usually
construed most favorably for the insured all cases of doubt or uncertainty in terms. Burkhard v. Traveller's Ins. Co., 102 Pa. 262;
Niagara Fire Ins. Co. v. Scammon, 106 Ill. 644.
Holland's death was clearly accidental. It then remains for us
to determine whether it was occasioned by external and violent means.
The question then arises: May death caused by a tubstance taken internally be deemed to have been occasioned by external and violent
means? The greater weight of authority answers in the affirmative
as the following cases bear testimony. In Healy v. Mutual Accident
Association (Ill.), 9 L. R. A. 371, there is the exact parallel to the
case before us. There it was held that death produced by poison
accidentally taken was within the terms of a policy insuring against
death by external, violent and accidental means. American Accident Co. v. Reigart (Ky.), 21 L. R. A. 651, held that death caused
by the lodging of a particle of food in the throat of the insured was
through violent and external means. Traveller's Ins. Co. v. Dunlap, 160 Ill. 642, held death caused by an overdose of laudanum to be
occasioned by external means. In Miller v. Fidelity and Casualty Co.,
97 Fed. 836, the insured swallowed "certain hard, pointed and resistant substances of wood," which so perforated the intestinal canal,
the tissue of which had been weakened by illness, as to cause death.
The court declared this "to have been caused by external, violent and
accidental means, for they originated outside of the body, and were
accidentally violent, although the accident took place within.
The
insurance is not, by the first clause quoted limited to an external effect, nor to one beginning on the surface. The accidental operation
of external means may be wholly internal." Jenkins v. Hawkeye Commercial Men's Association, 30 L. R. A. (N. S.), 1181, held death from
blood poisoning due to perforation of rectum by a bone, presumably
swallowed with food was caused by external, violent and accidental
means within the meaning of those terms in an insurance policy.
In Paul v. Traveller's Ins. Co., 112 N. Y. 420, a recovery was had
on a policy insuring against death caused by "external, violent and accidental means," where the insured died from inhaling gas. Lowenstein v. Fidelity and Casualty Co., 46 L. R. A. 450, is similar in facts
and result to Paul v. Traveller's Ins. Co., cited supra. In Dezell v.
Fidelity and Casualty Co., 176 Mo. 253, there was a recovery where
death was caused by an overdose of morphine, and in McClother v.
Provident Mutual Accident Co., 60 U. S. App. 705, in which death resulted from the taking of poison under the mistaken belief that it
was a harmless medicine, it was stated that such death was an accident, and there could be a recovery on the policy had it not been for
the exception of death from poison contained therein.
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The oi0y case to question the principle established in the foregoing cases is Hill v- Hartford Accident Ins. Co., 22 Hun. 187, and
relied on by the defendant, in which it was held that death resulting
from the drinking of poison by mistake for water was not effected
through external, violent and accidental means; but this decision is
no longer of any authority since it was overruled by Paul v. Traveller's Ins. Co., cited supra.
Pollock v. U. S. Mut. Association, 102 Pa. 230, cited by the defendant, held that the insurance company was not liable for death
resulting from the accidental taking of poison; but in that case the
reason for the decision was an express stipulation in the policy that
the company was not liable for death resulting from taking poison,
and that removes it from the question presented in this case.
In these cases the courts have kept in mind the "means" and
not the injury, for while the accidental operation may be wholly internal yet the means may be external.
We therefore render a verdict for the plaintiff.
OPINION OF THE SUPERIOR COURT
Besides the cases cited by the learned court below, may be considered Riley v. Interstate Business Men's Accident Association, (Iowa),
152 N. W. 617, which recognizes that a death produced by strychnine
given the insured by a doctor, through mistake, resulted from violent,
external and accidental means.
The judgment is affirmed.

LENOX v. BRADLEY
Sales

-

Warranty That Goods Answer Description Severability

Contract

-

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Bradley ordered six horses at $125 each, describing their qualities, from Lennox, who in fulfilment of the order, sent six. Three of
them were found by Bradley to correspond with his description, and
were retained, and a check tendered for their price, $375. Bradley
notified Lennox that the other three were not such as he had ordered,
that he declined to keep them and that Lennox should take them
away. Lennox refusing to take the horses back, sues for the price.
OPINION OF THE COURT
TODD, J. By studying the facts in this case we find in the
order an executory contract. When a contract is executory, as it
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always is when a particular article is ordered without being, seen,
from one who undertakes it shall be of a given quality or description, and the thing sent as such is never completely accepted, the
buyer is not to keep it, or pay for the article on any terms, although
no fraud was intended by the vendor.
Williston on Sales, page 866, states that, "If goods have been sent
to a buyer, of a kind or quality which he never agreed to take, the
seller is a mere volunteer and the buyer is in the position of a bailee
who has had goods thrust upon him without his assent. Accordingly,
he is under no obligation to return the goods to the seller and after
notice that the goods are not and will not be accepted, the seller
must assume the burden of removing them, and they are at his risk."
Tiffany on Sales 247, Benjamin on Sales 145, Whitaker v. Eastwick,
75 Pa. 229; Eagan v. Call, 34 Pa. 236; Wilson v. Belles, 22 Sup. 477.
In 35 L. R. A. (N. S.) 280, it is stated that if a man agrees to sell
something of a particular description he cannot require the buyer to
take something which 's of a different description, and a sale of
goods by description implies a condition that the .goods shall correspond to it. Moore v. Moore, 83 Maine 473; Evans v. Laury, 67 N. J.
Law 163; Carlton v. Lombard, 149 N. Y. 137.
That the buyer may accept such of the articles tendered as fulfil the seller's obligation and reject those which do not is laid down
in Young v. Wakefield, 121 Mass. 91.
In Wilson v. Belles, 22 Sup. 477, which is a corresponding Pennsylvania case, a man ordered a wagon from a trade catalogue describing it by a particular number. The purchaser, in a suit for the price
of the wagon, avers in his affidavit of defense that the wagon was
not of the style which he had ordered by number in the catalogue,
but an entirely different wagon; that the wagon did not stand the
strain of the number of passengers specified in the catalogue, and
that he immediately gave notice of these facts to the plaintiff, and
offered to return the wagon. The court held, that "in executory sales
the seller warrants that the article shall be of the kind ordered and
merchantable in quality."
These doctrines of common law have been affirmed in the Pennsylvania Sales Act of 1915, which we think decides the question in this
case. Sec. 14, P. L. 1915, page 546, "Where there is a contract to
sell or a sale of goods by description there is an implied warranty that
the goods shall correspond with the description."
See. 47, page 556--"Where goods are delivered to the buyer which
he has not previously examined, he is not deemed to have accepted
them, unless and until he has had a reasonable opportunity of examining them for the purpose of ascertaining whether they are in conformity with the contract."
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Sec. 44, page 555--"Where the seller delivers to the buyer the
goods he contracted to sell, mixed with goods of a different description not included within the contract, the buyer may accept the
goods which are in accordance with the contract and reject the rest,
or he may reject the whole."
See. 50, page 557-"Unless otherwise agreed where goods are
delivered to the buyer and he refuses to accept them, having the
right so to do, he is not bound to return them to the seller but, it is
sufficient if he notifies the seller that he refuses to accept them."
Therefore after a serious and conscientious scrutiny of the common law, and the several sections under the Sales Act of 1915, we
fail to discover anything that might hold the defendant to the full
amount of the contract.
Judgment for defendant.
OPINION OF THE SUPERIOR COURT
There is no provision in the uniform sales act by which the precise question to which this case gives rise may be determined. Sec.
44 (3) provides that "Where the seller delivers to the buyer the goods
he contracted to sell mixed with goods of a different description not
included in the contract the buyer may accept the goods which are
in accordance with the contract and reject the rest, or he may reject
the whole." This section is not, however, applicable to the present
case because the seller has not delivered to the buyer "the goods h;
contracted to sell."
It is unquestionably true that "where there is a contract to sell
goods by description there is an implied warranty that the good3
shall correspond with the description" and that upon the breach of
this warranty the buyer may "rescind the contract and offer to retun
(the goods) to the seller" and that if he does so he "shall cease to be
liable for the price." Uniform Sales Act, Sec. 14, 69 (1) d, (4).
The question in this case is whether, when he accepts one portion.
of the goods and rejects, and offers to return another, he "ceases to
be liable" for the price of the latter portion or becomes liable for
both portions.
The rule is well settled that where the contract of sale is an "entire" contract, the rescission must be in toto. The purchaser cannot
rescind the contract, and at the same time retain a part of the goods
purchased. In other words he cannot at the same time both rescind
and affirm the contract. See elaborate note Ann. Cas. 1912 A 657.
In Elzea v. Brown, 59 Super. 403, where the defendant was sued for
the purchase price of a quantity of eggs, a portion of which ne rejected as being of an inferior quality, the court said. "The defendant
was therefore legally liable to pay for the goods at the con:', tct

DICKINSON

LAW REVIEW

price. He was bound to keep all the eggs or put them at the plaintiff's disposal by a recission of the contract. He could not return
some and retain some. The rescission must he of the entire contract."
It seems, however, to be equally well settled that there may be
cases in which the contract is so far severable that one portion of it
is independent of all others so that acceptance and enjoyment thereof
do not interfere with a complete restoration of the status quo of
the others, and that in these cases there may be a partial rescission.
Elliot on Contracts 5114.
Was the contract in this case entire or severable? "The question
whether a contract is entire or sevarable is often of great importance.
Any contract may consist of many parts; and these may be considered
as parts of one whole, or as so many distinct contracts entered into
at the same time, and expressed in the same instrument, but not
thereby made one contract. No precise rule can be given by which
this question in a given case may be settled. If the part to be performed by one party consists of several distinct and separate items,
and the price to be paid by the other is apportioned to each item to
be performed, such a contract will generally be held to be severable."
2 Parsons on Contracts 517.
The latter doctrine was applied in Barnett v. Becker, 25 Super. 22,
a case which closely resembles the present case. In deference to this
decision we hold that the question whether the contract was severable
should have been submitted to the jury. The jury might have found
under the evidence and the law applicable thereto that the contract
was severable. We are not willing to declare it severable as a matter of law and think that the learned court below erred in so doing
Reversed with v. f. d. n.

WILLIAMSON v. INSURANCE CO.
Insurance-Innocent Misrepresentation-Warranty
STATEMENT OF FACTS
John Williamson obtained from the defendant a policy of life insurance for $5000.00. The policy stated that the assertions of the applicant with respect to his health should be deemed representations.
One of these assertions was that the applicant had no organic disease. He was ignorant of the fact that he had such a disease,
though in fact he had heart trouble of which one year subsequently
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he died. The administrator is suing on the policy.
defends on the ground of misrepresentation.
Alexaitis, for the plaintiff.
Achterman, for the defendant.

The company

OPINION OF THE COURT
HESKETT, J. This case presents for determination the question
whether an innocent representation made by an applicant for a life
insurance policy, false in fact, is sufficient ground for avoidance of
the contract by the insurer after the death of the insured.
It is well to note before deciding this question that no provision
is made whereby the applicant must answer truly nor so far as we
know does the policy contain any clause whereby the contract was to
he void in case of misrepresentation. The policy simply provides
that "the answers of the applicant shall be deemed representations."
This precludes the law applicable to warranties made under like circumstances for it is said in Aicher v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 13
Phila. 139, that a representation may be made a part of the contract
of life insurance when it assumes the form of a warranty, a covenant,
or a condition, or when referred to in the policy in terms which plainly show that it was intended by the parties to be an essential part of
the contract. But a mere naked reference to it in the policy will not
have that effect. An interpretation that a clause is a warranty will
always be avoided, if possible. Mouler v. American Life Ins. Co., 111
U. S. 335. In the light of these decisions, and also the facts themselves, this case does not fall within the act of June 23, 1885 P. L. 134.
which relates only to policies containing a clause of warranty to the
truth of the answers, nor can we be guided by the numerous decisions avoiding policies for misrepresentation under warranties or some
specific clause of the policy, itself.
It is pointed out in Wheeler v. Hardesty, 8 Ellis & B. 232, "the
cases which were cited to show that an untrue representation would
avoid the policy in the absence of fraud, failed to show that this
rule applied to life insurance, unless the policy contained an expresa
provision that the representation was to be the basis, or a condition,
of the contract."
In the case of Woehrle v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 46 N. Y.
Supp. 862, the charge, "If the answers were representations only, and
a disease existed in the insured, of which he knew nothing and to
which he honestly answered 'No,' there might be a recovery," was
held to be -correct.
Also in Patton v. United Life and Accident Asso., 141 N. Y. 589,
it was decided that where representations are made as to good health
of the applicant, unless the insured knew at the time or had cause to
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know that his statement was false, there could be a recovery.
This question was decided in the Supreme Court of the United
States, that where the contract provided that certain statements
should he representations, the insured is required simply to use the
utmost good faith, and deal fairly and honestly as to material facts.
Mouler v. American Life Ins. Co., 111 U. S. 335.
In Pennsylvania the law applicable is stated in March v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 186 Pa. 629. A representation in the law of insurance is an incidental statement made by the insured in regard to
some feature of the risk upon the faith of which the contract is
entered into. It differs from a warranty in that to avoid the policy
it fhust be a fact material to the risk and must be either wilfully false
or grossly negligent in character. We know in the case at bar that
the representation was innocently, and therefore not wilfully false,
and there is nothing to show that the insured was grossly negligent.
We think this case may be distinguished from Lewis v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 57 Superior 406, because the decision there rested
on the fact that the statements of the applicant were shown to be
true so that there were no misrepresentations. However, in view of
the foregoing authorities we are constrained to hold that where a
policy of life insurance contains the bare provision that the statements
of the applicant shall be deemed representations, innocent misrepresentations made thereunder, in the absence of knowledge of their
falsity, and without negligence, are not sufficient ground for avoidance of the policy by the insurer.
Judgment is therefore given for the plaintiff.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
The applicant for insurance stated to the company, in order to
procure the insurance, that he had no organic disease. The possession of such a disease was doubtless a material fact; that is a fact the
knowledge of which, by the Company, would have determined it not
to accept the risk, or, to insist on a higher premium. The statement
might have been made as a warranty, that is, it might have been explicitly stated that its truth was the condition of the company's assuming liability. It being a warranty, the possession by the insured
at the time of his application of "heart trouble" which one year later,
caused death, would have made the policy void.
The statement however, was not formally warranted. It was a
"representation."
There are authorities, however, which virtually
convert a representation of a material fact into a warranty, although
the parties to the contract do not so term it. "The untruth of any
material representation relied upon by the insurer in making the contract will avoid the contract, wholly irrespective of the character of
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the intent, whether innocent or fraudulent, with which such representation was made." Vance, Ins. p. 268.
"Representations as to a
material matter which are false in fact avoid the policy, although not
fraudulently made." 25 Cyc. 801; 805.
A different view is taken by other authorities, which hold that
the mere untruth of a -representation, not made a warranty by the
contract, even of a material fact, a representation believed true by the
applicant for insurance will not vitiate the policy. U. B. Mutual Aid
Society v. Kinter, 12 W. N. C. 76; Suravitz v. Prudential Ins. Co., 244
Pa. 582; March v. Life Ins. Co., 186 Pa. 645; Washington Ins. Co. v.
Schaible, 1 W. N. C. 369. Of the first of these cases, Elkins, J., remarks in 244 Pa. 582, "That case was put upon the ground that the
applicant is bound to exercise good faith in disclosing such facts about
the condition of his health, as are known to him, and which he honestly believes to be true, and that he is not bound to know at his peril of
the existence of a disease which experience teaches may exist in
latent form and concerning which one may not in the very nature of
things have exact knowledge."
When Williamson stated that he had no organic disease he was
mistaken. He had in fact "heart trouble," but he was ignorant of the
fact. As he was not required to warrant the truth of the assertion,
the enforceableness of the defendant's policy does not depend upon its
truth. The learned court below therefore properly entered judgment
for the plaintiff.
Judgment affirmed.

BOOK REVIEWS
A History of Continental Criminal Law, by Carl Ludwig von Bar,
and others. Little, Brown & Co., 1916.
The publication of a series of historical works on Law, has been
undertaken, under the auspices of the Association of American Law
Schools. That whose title is prefixed to this notice, is the sixth of
the series. An editorial preface, of much interest, by that accomplished lawyer, philosopher and law writer, John Henry Wigmore,
precedes the work proper. This is followed by an original introduction by Wm.Rennick Riddell, Justice of the Supreme Court of Ontario, and by a second introduction by Prof. Keedy of the University
of Pennsylvania. The work proper, is divided into two parts, of which
the first is a General History of the Criminal Law, and the second a
History of the Theories of Criminal Law.
Some of the subjects
treated in the first part are The Roman Law, the Primitive Germanic
Criminal Law, the Christian Church's Law, the Medieval Germanic
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Law, the Law of Scandinavia and Switzerland and of France in the
latter Middle Ages. The criminal law of the European countries is
traced through the modern .epoch. The second part of the book deals
with Theories of Criminal Law. The theories of Greece and Rome, of
Europe in the Middle Ages, theories from Grotius to Rousseau, from
Beccaria to Feuerbach, from Bentham to Herbart, and in Germany
from Flegal to Binding are lucidly and interestingly presented. An
appendix gives Von Bar's critique of the theory of criminal law.
We have seldom read a more interesting book. Nothing could
be more fascinating to the curious student of human politically organized groups, than this exhibit of their varying conceptions of the
aims and the methods of penalization; and of the changing religious,
moral, social sentiments which find expression in their criminal legislation. That such a work has been translated and published, is a sign
of the belief of the promoters of the publication in a growing interest
in legal philosophy and history. We earnestly commend the work
to the attention of all who care to know how the actual institutions
under which they live, have slowly, painfully with constant fluctuations, come to be what we find them. The Boston publishers are to
be commended for undertaking so grave and hazardous an enterprise
as that of publishing the invaluable series of works, of which this is
a member.
The Gist of Real Property Law, by Harold G. Aron. Writers
Publishing Co., New York City, 1916.
This attempt rather courageous to put the substance of the law
of Real Property into 250 pages, was made "primarily," says the
author, "to meet the requirements of the summer school course in
New York Law School." That school must be credited with the production of one of the best works extent, on the subject of Real.
Property, that of Alfred G. Reeves.
The present book is a good
summary. The necessity of compression leads to an occasional obscurity, but as a synopsis of Real Property Law, it may be commended to the attention of students who are preparing for examinations, while it is not unworthy of a reading for review purposes, by
experienced attorneys.
Occasionally a statement appears which
causes a slight shock, as that on page 52, concerning the statute of
uses. "The statute failed completely, and its effect was to discard
the word use and substitute the word trust, and later to render necessary the Statute of Wills in order to make feuds devisable, enacted
in 1545. The statute did not accomplish all that its authors expected it to accomplish, but to affirm that it "failed completely," is a
serious exaggeration.
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Criminality and Economic Conditions by William A. Bonger,
translated from the French by Henry G. Horton. Little, Brown &
Co., Boston, 1916.
This interesting and important book is the eighth of the Modern
Criminal Science Series; published under the auspices of The AmeriThe author atcan Institute of Criminal Law and Criminology.
tempts to account for crime. He rejects the theory of atavism, advocated by Lombroso, (p. 382). He allows a certain scope to defecThe chief
tive moral and mental constitution of the individual.
cause however of crime he finds in the economic condition of human
beings. The divorce of labor from capital, the possession of the latter by other than those who furnish the former, leads, in his opinion
to the exaltation of egoism and the corresponding depression of altruism, and these are the causes of crimes against property, crimes
of violence and sexual crimes. "Upon the basis of what has gone
before," he concludes "we have a right to say that the part played
by economic conditions in criminality is preponderant, even decisive."
The learned author thinks the abrogation of the principle of competition is feasible, and that it will entail the suppression of far the
largest part of crime. Since, he argues, "crime is the consequence of
economic and social conditions, we can combat it by changing these
conditions."
It is not in supporting this hypothesis, that the work possesses
its chief value. As Justice Norcross, in his introduction, states, "The
book will bring to the American reader a depth and breadth of view,
most valuable to the administration of criminal law, and to those interested in the wider field of general social programs."
The work is well worthy of the attention of all students of the
important subjects of criminology.

